This paper investigates three distinctive and intuitive renegotiation bargaining protocols that all yield the Shapley value as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. These protocols, built on the multi-bidding procedure of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), allow more freedom in multilateral bargaining where rejected players can further negotiate and form coalitions. The self-duality of the Shapley value plays a key role in the second and third results. Moreover, these renegotiation protocols allow an actual play along the equilibrium path to restore the Shapley value in case of a 'mistake' made before.
Introduction
Almost at the same time when the two fundamental solution concepts for game theory, Nash equilibrium (Nash (1950a) ) and Nash bargaining solution (Nash (1950b) ), were established, John Nash (1953) pointed out the importance and necessity of using both axiomatic and strategic approaches to bridge the gap between its non-cooperative side and cooperative side. A comprehensive survey on this research agenda, called Nash program, is provided by Serrano (2005) , and broadly for implementation theory, we refer to Jackson (2001) . Discussions on this program in relation to mechanism design theory can be found in Trockel (2002) .
1 In his presidential address to the Econometric Society, Maskin (2003) outlined coalitions and externalities as core topics for game theory in the coming years and highlighted adopting both axiomatic and strategic approaches, which was reiterated in his talk at the Nobel Panel meeting of the 2008 Games Congress in Chicago. Although the Shapley value, a major solution concept for cooperative games, was invented in the same period (Shapley (1953) ) along the work of Nash, it was not until over thirty years later that the first non-cooperative study on this solution concept was proposed: a bilateral bargaining procedure by Gul (1989 Gul ( , 1999 . Hart and Mas-Collel (1996) constructed a multilateral bargaining procedure to obtain the Shapley value. This procedure is further studied in Krishna and Serrano (1995) . By endogenizing the selection of a proposer, Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) developed the multi-bidding mechanism (Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2002) ) that yields the Shapley value in actual terms. Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) also offered an extensive discussion of the non-cooperative study on the Shapley value.
The current research contributes to the non-cooperative study of the multilateral coalitional bargaining in two main aspects.
Firstly, the option for rejected players to have chance to form a coalition again and then renegotiate with existing players is modeled and analyzed. So far in the literature most bargaining protocols for the Shapley value require a rejected proposer to simply leave the game and stand alone, i.e., losing all the possibilities of forming coalitions with anyone else. This contradicts our real life observation that those who are excluded from a party (or a certain organization) may well organize into a new party, and even further renegotiate with the old party for potential greater benefits. Such a possibility seems necessary to explore. Based on the original multi-bidding mechanism proposed by Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), we construct three non-cooperative bargaining protocols to study the option of renegotiation.
These renegotiation bargaining protocols not only seem realistic, but also lead to actual plays on equilibrium paths. Unlike most bargaining procedures in the literature that only obtain the Shapley value at the first stage in subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), the renegotiation protocols introduced in the paper allow players to actually go through the following stages and still realize the Shapley value.
Secondly, the paper offers a robustness study of the Shapley value in non-cooperative bargaining with different renegotiation protocols. Ju and Wettstein (2009) proposes a generalized bidding mechanism and shows that by introducing a renegotiation stage 2 a bargaining game may generate completely different value allocations in equilibrium. The three renegotiation protocols presented in this paper restore the Shapley value in SPE, despite the expanded options in bargaining, which provide additional support to this major cooperative solution concept. In addition, it is worthwhile to note that the self-duality of the Shapley value, a desired axiomatic property but under-explored in the literature of Nash program, plays an important role in the proofs of this study. Hence, the non-cooperative approach further enhances our understanding of the cooperative side of the Shapley value.
The next section provides the preliminaries. In Section 3 we construct the three distinctive non-cooperative bargaining protocols with renegotiation and show that they all yield the Shapley value in SPE. The final section offers some concluding remarks.
The cooperative model and the Shapley value
We denote by N = {1, ..., n} the set of players, and by S ⊆ N a coalition of players. A transferable utility (TU) game in characteristic form is denoted by (N, v) where v : 2 N → R is a characteristic function satisfying v(∅) = 0. The class of all TU games with player set N is denoted by T U N . Throughout the paper, |S| denotes the cardinality of S, and for simplicity we use |S| = s. When no confusion arises, let |N | = n. For a coalition S, v(S) is the total payoff that the members in S can obtain if S forms. For notational simplicity, given i ∈ N , we use v(i) instead of v({i}) to denote the stand-alone payoff of player i. A value is a mapping f which associates with every game (N, v) a vector in R N . A value determines the payoffs for every player in the game. Given a cooperative game (N, v) and a subset S ⊆ N , we define the subgame (S, v| S ) by assigning the value v| S (T ) ≡ v(T ) for any T ⊆ S.
We denote by ϕ the Shapley value for game (N, v) which is defined by
for all i ∈ N . It is the unique value that satisfies efficiency, additivity, symmetry and the null player property. Moreover, it is well-known that the Shapley value is self-dual (cf. Kalai and Samet (1987) 
The renegotiation mechanisms
In this section, we construct three different bargaining protocols with the option of renegotiation and show that all of them yield the Shapley value as the unique SPE outcome. Although these three mechanisms are different in the specific renegotiation design, they share the same basic structure, which can be described briefly and informally as follows.
Players firstly participate in a bidding stage a la Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) to choose a proposer.
3 At the next stage the proposer offers a vector of payments to all other players in exchange for joining her to form the grand coalition. This is equivalent to saying that the proposer makes a scheme showing how to split v(N ) among all the players. At stage 3, all the other players sequentially decide to agree or reject the offer. The offer is accepted if all players accept it, and is rejected if at least one player rejects. In case of acceptance the grand coalition forms and the proposer receives v(N ) out of which she pays out the offers made. In case of rejection this (rejected) proposer 'waits' (instead of getting her stand-alone payoff) while all the other players go again through the same game. We now investigate the possibility that the rejected proposers can further bargain among themselves to form a coalition, following which they may be able to renegotiate with the 'incumbent' players, to obtain what we term the renegotiation mechanisms.
Inspired by the real world cases such as a rejected party leader can form a new party with his followers, or a departed founding member of a company may establish a new firm by hiring some staff from the former company, we construct the first renegotiation mechanism. It specifies that the first rejected proposer has power to unite all rejected proposers and then renegotiate with the incumbent players. The second renegotiation mechanism is a natural variant, which has the incumbent player make a renegotiation offer to the first rejected proposer. The third mechanism is more flexible. Rather than having the first rejected proposer have power to unite all rejected proposers, it allows every proposer, when rejected, to be able to bargain and form a coalition with the immediately preceding rejected proposer.
As for how these three mechanisms precisely proceed and differ in the respective renegotiation stages, we refer to the following formal descriptions.
Mechanism A. If there is only one player {i}, she simply receives v(i). When the player set N = {1, . . . , n} consists of two or more players, the mechanism is defined recursively. Stages 1 to 3 provide for any set of (active) players S a proposer in S, chosen via a bidding procedure (stage 1), an offer made by the proposer to the rest of the players in S (stage 2) who then accept or reject (stage 3). If stage 3 ends with a rejection, all players in S other than the rejected proposer proceed again through stages 1 to 3 where the set of active players is reduced by excluding the rejected proposer. If stage 3 ends with acceptance, for S = N the game ends; but for a coalition S smaller than N , the game moves to stage 4. At stage 4, all previously rejected proposers, i.e., the inactive players N \S, have one more chance to organize themselves. The earliest rejected proposer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to every other player in N \S. If this offer is rejected, then the game ends with players in N \S receiving their stand-alone payoffs. If the offer is accepted, then the game proceeds to stage 5, where the earliest rejected proposer, as now the representative of N \S, makes a 'renegotiation' offer to the proposer of S. If this renegotiation offer is accepted, then S and N \S merge into the grand coalition and the game ends; otherwise, the game stops such that the two sides stay split.
The mechanism starts with S = N .
The net bids are used to measure players' willingness to become the proposer. Let i s = argmax i∈S (B i ) where in case of a non-unique maximizer we choose any of these maximal bidders to be the 'winner' with equal probability. Once the winner i s has been chosen, player i s pays every player j ∈ S\{i s } her bid b is j .
Stage 2: Player i s makes a vector of offers x is j ∈ R to every player j ∈ S\{i s }. (This offer is additional to the bids paid at stage 1.)
Stage 3: The players in S other than i s , sequentially, either accept or reject the offer. If at least one player rejects it, then the offer is rejected. Otherwise, the offer is accepted.
If the offer made at stage 2 is rejected, all players in S other than i s proceed again through the mechanism from stage 1 where the set of active players is S\{i s }.
4
Meanwhile, player i s , together with all previously rejected proposers N \S, waits for the negotiation outcome of S\{i s }.
If the offer of i s is accepted, we have to distinguish between two cases where S = N and S ̸ = N . In the case where S = N , which means that all players agree with the proposer on the scheme of sharing v(N ), the game ENDS. Then, the final payoff to
In the case where S ̸ = N , the game moves to stage 4.
Stage 4: The first rejected proposer i n proposes a vector of take-it-or-leave-it payments y in i k ∈ R to every rejected proposer i k where k = s+1, ..., n−1. These players, sequentially, either accept or reject the proposal. Again, acceptance requires unanimity.
If the proposal is rejected, then the game ends with all rejected proposers in N \S standing alone. Thus, i s finally receives
If the proposal is accepted, then i n pays the offer y in i k ∈ R to every player i k where
.., n − 1, and the coalition N \S is formed, of which i n becomes the representative. The game proceeds to stage 5.
Stage 5: Player i n makes a renegotiation offer z in is ∈ R to i s who is the representative of S.
If the renegotiation offer is rejected by i s , then the game ends with both sides, S and N \S, staying apart. Thus, i s finally receives
and each player i k for k = s+1, ..., n−1 finally receives y
If i s accepts the renegotiation offer, then i n pays z in is to i s so that the grand coalition N is formed. Hence, the game ends and i s finally receives z
and each player i k for k = s + 1, ..., n − 1 finally receives y
To make it clearer, here we explicitly explain the amount of payoff that players in S\{i s } will bargain for, although it is incorporated in the description of the following stages provided below. Because of the chance of renegotiation at stages 4 and 5, players in S\{i s } bid for becoming the proposer i s−1 so as to win the offer z in is−1 made by i n at stage 5. In equilibrium, it equals v(S\{i s }).
We note that in the case the mechanism reaches the situation where the set of active players consists of one player only, i.e., |S| = 1, the corresponding stages 1 to 3 are redundant and this single player is considered as the proposer for herself whose offer is accepted immediately and the game continues to stage 4.
The idea of having the first rejected proposer making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to all other rejected players is consistent with many real world observations. After a CEO quits a company, his followers may go with him, and then he may set up a competing firm with these colleagues. And it is not rare that these two firms could well merge some time later. Similar stories apply to political parties and their leaders.
We will show that for any (strictly) superadditive To facilitate the understanding of the result, we sketch a key reasoning that underlies the feature of the mechanism. One readily sees that, among rejected proposers, only i n can potentially get extra payoff beyond her stand-alone payoff, due to the right to propose to all the rejected players at stage 4. In SPE, she will offer the stand-alone payoffs to these players. Anticipating this, any subsequent proposer would not make an offer that will be rejected: by superadditivity, we know that making an offer that will be accepted results in a higher payoff to the proposer than his stand-alone payoff, the SPE outcome if being rejected. Hence, reasoning further backward, the first proposer i n , if her offer is rejected, will actually end up with her stand-alone payoff. Consequently, despite a potential advantage of gaining a big surplus by making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to those who got rejected after her, it is impossible (because everyone else is smart) for the first rejected proposer to substantiate it. With this in mind and due to superadditivity, in equilibrium, i n will also make an offer that is accepted by all players in N \{i n }.
Proof (of Theorem 3.1) Let (N, v) be a superadditive game. Before showing that every SPE yields the payoff vector ϕ(N, v), we first show that the Shapley value is an SPE outcome by explicitly constructing such an SPE. Consider the following strategies (we describe it for the active set of players, S):
At stage 2, a proposer, player i s , offers x is j = ϕ j (S\{i s }, v| S\{is} ) to every j ∈ S\{i s }. At stage 3, any player j ∈ S\{i s } accepts any offer which is greater than or equal to ϕ j (S\{i s }, v| S\{is} ) and rejects any offer strictly less than ϕ j (S\{i s }, v| S\{is} ).
At stage 4, the first rejected proposer i n makes an offer y
to any subsequently rejected proposer i k where k = s+1, ..., n−1. And any i k , where k = s+1, ..., n−1, accepts an offer y in i k ≥ v({i k }) and rejects it otherwise. At stage 5, as the representative of N \S, i n offers z in is = v(S) to i s , while i s accepts any offer greater than or equal to v(S) and rejects any offer strictly less than it.
Clearly the combination of these strategies of all players in N leads to acceptance at stage 3, which yields the Shapley value for any player who is not the proposer. Moreover, given that following the strategies the offer is accepted by all players and the grand coalition is formed, the proposer also obtains her Shapley value.
With the reasoning for stages 4 and 5 provided immediately before the proof, one can readily verify the above strategies are indeed best responses by superadditivity. To show that the strategies of the active players at stages 1, 2 and 3 are on a subgame perfect equilibrium path, we proceed by induction. The induction hypothesis is that whenever the game reaches a round with s active players comprising the set S, then in any SPE of the game induced by Mechanism A, each player j ∈ S obtains ϕ j (S, v| S ). To see this induction assumption holds for s = 1, note that when s = 1, the 'offer' (that is made by i 1 to himself) is vacuously accepted. Thus, the payoff to i 1 is v({i 1 }), which is indeed ϕ i 1 ({i 1 }, v| {i 1 } ). We now assume it holds for any set of s active players, where 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1, and then show that it holds for any set of s + 1 active players.
To show that for an arbitrary set of s + 1 active players, say S ∪ {i s+1 }, each player j ∈ S ∪ {i s+1 } obtains ϕ j (S ∪ {i s+1 }, v| S∪{i s+1 } ) in SPE, please note the following: the strategies of active players at stage 3 are on an SPE path by the induction assumption; the strategy of the proposer at stage 2 is on an SPE path for a proposer that wishes to make an acceptable offer. More specifically, the reason that any proposer, other than the first rejected proposer i n , would like to make an acceptable offer is superadditivity. Consequently, by backward induction, i n can foresee that he can never obtain a higher payoff than v(N ) − v(N \{i n }) in SPE. Hence, making an acceptable offer by the first proposer is part of an SPE. Finally, to check that the actions at stage 1, i.e., the bids, complete an SPE, note that all net bids equal zero by the balanced contributions property for the Shapley value (Myerson (1980) ). Any deviation in the bids made by a player i cannot increase that player's payoff: lowering her total bids makes another player become the proposer, this will not change her payoff as all other players still bid the same way; raising her total bids can only lower her final payoff; maintaining the same level of her total bids does not improve her payoff.
The proof that any SPE yields the Shapley value involves induction as well. Although the induction hypothesis is essentially the same as the above one, we slightly modify it for the convenience of presentation. Here, the induction assumption is that whenever the game reaches a round with s active players comprising the set S, then in any SPE of the game induced by Mechanism A, each player j ∈ S obtains ϕ j (S, v| S ). This induction assumption apparently holds for s = 1. We now assume it holds for any set of s − 1 active players, where 2 ≤ s ≤ n, and then show that it holds for any set of s active players by a series of claims. Please note that since this proof proceeds along similar lines as the unicity proof of Theorem 1 in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001), we will omit its details. But for completeness, below we present these claims and provide some key explanations. Claim (3). In any SPE at stage 3, any player j ∈ S\{i s } accepts any offer which is greater than or equal to ϕ j (S\{i s }, v| S\{is} ) and rejects any offer strictly less than ϕ j (S\{i s }, v| S\{is} ).
One can readily see that claims (1) and (2) follow directly from superadditivity, while claim (3) is due to the induction assumption.
Claim (4). In any SPE at stage 2, a proposer i s , where 2 ≤ s ≤ n − 1, offers x is j = ϕ j (S\{i s }, v| S\{is} ) to every j ∈ S\{i s }; and i n may have two different strategies: one is to offer x in j = ϕ j (N \{i n }, v| N \{in} ) to every j ∈ N \{i n }, and the other is to offer
It is easy to see this is the best response for any subsequent proposer after i n due to superadditivity, because any lower offer would be rejected, which results in the stand-alone payoff to him by claim (2). However, for the first proposer, i n , it is still part of an SPE strategy to make an unacceptable offer at stage 2, so long as later at the renegotiation stage, he offers z in i n−1 = v(N \{i n }), which will result in the same payoff to i n as in the case where he makes an acceptable offer at stage 2.
Claim (5). In any SPE, B i = B j for all i, j ∈ N and hence B i = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Claim (6). In any SPE, each player's payoff is the same regardless of who is chosen as the proposer.
Claim (7). In any SPE, the final payoff received by each player coincides with each player's Shapley value.
The proofs of claims (5), (6) and (7) can be constructed in the same way as in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) . 2 Please note that in the above mechanism, even if the strict superadditivity is imposed, the SPE strategies are not unique, which is different from that of Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) . The flexibility of multiple SPE comes from the option of renegotiation. Contrasting with the SPE involving immediate acceptance by every j ∈ N \{i n } at stage 3, a different SPE allows i n to make an unacceptable offer (e.g., x in j < ϕ j (N \{i n }, v| N \{in} ) to some j ∈ N \{i n }) at stage 2 but later, at the renegotiation stage, to offer z in i n−1 = v(N \{i n }), which restores the Shapley value outcome for every player.
We have seen that Mechanism A specifies a rule that at stage 5 it is the first rejected proposer, i n , now as the representative of N \S, who has the power to make an offer to i s in renegotiation. In equilibrium obviously i n will offer v(S) to i s , which makes stages 4 and 5 strategically redundant in generating the Shapley value beyond stage 3. Is this rule really necessary to obtain the Shapley value if we adopt such a renegotiation design? Alternatively, will a rule having the accepted proposer, i s , now as the representative of S, make an offer to i n in renegotiation lead to a different outcome from the Shapley value? Surprisingly, the Shapley value is robust to such a change-in-power in the bargaining with renegotiation.
Mechanism B. The mechanism is identical structure-wise to Mechanism A. Stages 1, 2, 3 and 4 are in effect the same as in Mechanism A. The description below is restricted to stage 5, where the difference with Mechanism A lies.
Stage 5: Player i s makes a renegotiation offer z is in ∈ R to i n who represents N \S. If the renegotiation offer is rejected, then the game ends with both sides, S and N \S, staying apart. Thus, the payoff to each player is still the same as specified in the corresponding part of Mechanism A.
If the renegotiation offer is accepted, then i s pays z is in to i n so that the grand coalition N is formed. Hence, the game ends and i s finally receives
Theorem 3.2 For any superadditive game (N, v), the SPE outcomes of Mechanism B coincide with the payoff vector ϕ(N, v) as prescribed by the Shapley value.
Proof
The proof relies on the self-duality satisfied by the Shapley value. Due to superadditivity, at stage 5, the best response for i s is to offer z is in = v(N \S) to i n . Hence, in equilibrium, the amount of payoff that players in S bargain for equals v(N ) − v(N \S) instead of v(S) that was the case in Mechanism A. The proof thus proceeds as in that of Theorem 3.1, with the underlying characteristic function, describing the payoff to coalition S, given by
is the dual game of (N, v) and the Shapley value is self-dual, i.e.,
Comparing the above two renegotiation mechanisms, one may consider a compromised version (call the compromised mechanism) such that i s and i n bid for the right to make the renegotiation offer at stage 5. This will endogenize the selection of a proposer in renegotiation. Given Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2, we immediately obtain the following result.
Corollary 3.3 For any superadditive game (N, v) , the SPE outcomes of the compromised mechanism coincide with the payoff vector ϕ(N, v) as prescribed by the Shapley value.
The renegotiation mechanisms constructed so far require all the rejected proposers to wait until an active set of players S form into a coalition. Only by then will i n be able to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to all other rejected players to form a coalition N \S and can the game proceed to the renegotiation stage between S and N \S. Now we consider a protocol such that the rejected proposers can form coalitions among themselves timely with no need to wait up to the moment S is formed. That is, soon after a proposer is rejected, he can make an offer to the proposer got rejected immediately before him. This mechanism seems even more realistic and practical especially when concerning the short time span and distance between the adjacent rejections and the neighboring rejected proposers. It is interesting that again the Shapley value emerges as the only SPE outcome of this mechanism.
Mechanism C. Stages 1 and 2 are the same as in Mechanism A. The description is, therefore, only focused on those differences appearing at stages 3, 4 and 5.
Stage 3: The players in S other than i s , sequentially, either accept or reject the offer.
If the offer made at stage 3 is rejected, all players in S other than i s proceed again through the mechanism from stage 1. Meanwhile, the rejected proposer i s continues playing the game at stage 4.
If the offer of i s is accepted, we have two cases where S = N and S ̸ = N . If S = N , the game ends like in Mechanism A. If S ̸ = N , the game moves to stage 5a.
Stage 4:
The rejected proposer i s makes an offer y is i s+1 ∈ R to the previously rejected proposer i s+1 .
If the proposal is rejected by i s+1 , then i s enters stage 5b by himself, whereas the final payoff to any player i k where k = s + 1, ..., n is confirmed because he will not engage in any further negotiation. Note that i k may have already formed with other rejected proposers into a coalition denoted by
If the proposal is accepted by i s+1 , then i s pays the offer y is i s+1 ∈ R to i s+1 . Note that if before accepting the offer from i s , i s+1 has already formed a coalition with other rejected proposers, say T i s+1 , then a larger coalition T i s+1 ∪ {i s } is established and i s becomes its representative. The game proceeds to stage 5b.
Stage 5a: Player i s , as a representative of S, makes a renegotiation offer z is i s+1 ∈ R to i s+1 . Note that i s+1 is the representative of coalition T i s+1 ⊆ N \S, although T i s+1 could contain i s+1 solely if i s+1 failed to have his offer be accepted by i s+2 .
, then the game ends with both sides, S and T i s+1 , staying apart.
to i s+1 so that the coalition S ∪ T i s+1 is formed.
Hence, the game ends and i s finally receives
is and i s+1 finally receives z Proof Duality again plays a key role here and the proof proceeds in a similar manner of Theorem 3.2. Hence, we only present the crucial part of the proof below.
Due to superadditivity, it is obvious that in equilibrium all rejected proposers will form into a coalition. That is, any rejected proposer i k will offer y
consequently, the coalition is gradually expanded until N \S is formed before i s makes a renegotiation offer to i s+1 who is the representative of N \S. Therefore, at stage 5a, the best response for i s is to offer z
Consequently, in equilibrium, the amount of payoff that players in S are actually bargaining for equals v(N ) − v(N \S).
Thus, if an offer made by i s can be accepted by players in S\{i s } at stage 3, it necessarily requires the sum to be no less than v(N ) − v((N \S) ∪ {i s }). Next, by offering z
On the other hand, if i s was rejected at stage 3, he will become the representative of (N \S) ∪ {i s } at stage 4 in equilibrium (due to superadditivity), and (also) receives v((N \S) ∪ {i s }) − v(N \S) at stage 5b.
Comparing the above two cases, we can see that i s is indifferent between making an offer be accepted or rejected by S at stage 3. Consequently, we know that all SPE will be in the following format, i.e., it does not matter whether a proposer i s makes an offer be accepted or rejected at stage 3.
At stage 1, each player
At stage 2, a proposer, player i s , can make any offer x is j ∈ R to every j ∈ S\{i s }. At stage 3, any player j ∈ S\{i s } accepts any offer which is greater than or equal to ϕ j (S\{i s }, v d | S\{is} ) and rejects any offer strictly less than
At stage 4, i s makes an offer y is i s+1 = v(T i s+1 ) to i s+1 . And i s+1 accepts an offer
) and rejects it otherwise.
At stage 5a, as the representative of S, i s offers z
accepts any offer greater than or equal to v(T i s+1 ) and rejects it otherwise.
At stage 5b, as the representative of T is , i s accepts any offerz
and rejects it otherwise, while i s−1 offersz
Thus, the final payoff to i s , independent of the acceptance or rejection of his offer at stage 3, equals
For those who are not chosen as a proposer, it is obvious to see that their final payoffs are equal to the Shapley value of (N, v). 2
Based on the SPE strategy profile provided above, we like to highlight an intriguing feature of this mechanism: The Shapley value can be realized as an SPE outcome in the very beginning of the game (where at stage 2 the first proposer i n offers x in j = ϕ j (N \{i n }, v d | N \{in} ) to every j ̸ = i n ), or at any time later (e.g., after all players i s+1 , ..., i n have been rejected, i s makes an offer be rejected at stage 3 and further acts according to the strategy specified above). Hence, the mechanism allows players to go through the entire equilibrium path without necessarily stopping at the beginning of the game, while the Shapley value can be retained. This further shows that, even with the condition of strict superadditivity, unlike in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) , the SPE strategies of the above mechanisms are not unique despite their outcomes are the same. The Shapley value can be realized in an SPE where no renegotiation is actually played, or can be reached in an SPE where a proposer made his offer be rejected but later 'successfully' played at the renegotiation stage. As one can see, the only technical requirement we adopted to obtain the above results is the strict superadditivity on TU environment. One may wonder whether we can relax this assumption to an arbitrary TU game, like the way adopted in Pérez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) by using the Shapley value of the superadditive cover of the game. The answer is no because the superadditive cover does not necessarily rule out equality relations between the values of coalitions, which might lead to unacceptable offers looking for higher payoffs from the renegotiation stage rather than the formation of the grand coalition. On the other hand, if a TU game is such that its superadditive cover satisfies the strict superadditivity, then all the above results will hold.
Concluding remarks
The paper aims to develop new insights in strategic coalitional bargaining, and to push forward this research with a fresh treatment in modeling, where players are allowed to further negotiate and form coalitions after they were rejected in the first instance. This more realistic setup shows a certain robustness of the Shapley value in non-cooperative bargaining. One more original aspect lies in the use of the self-duality of the Shapley value, which plays a key role in proving the main results of the paper. This follows the spirit of the Nash program as we can better understand an axiomatic property by discovering its relevant strategic features. Moreover, as we can see from the above mechanisms (see especially the comment after Theorem 3.4), allowing options for rejected players to further negotiate and form coalitions is not only interesting in restoring the Shapley value per se, but also helps to yield the Shapley value in a much more flexible manner: many more SPE can emerge and they do not require immediate acceptance at the beginning of the game.
Regarding the renegotiation protocol, one may naturally ask a question: Why not simply let the rejected proposers play again the bidding stage and offer stage, like the incumbent players do? The reason is that such a construction may lead to endless repetition without a proper stopping rule of the game. One can of course deal with this issue by introducing a discount factor or breakdown probability, which will end up in a similar situation to the one studied in Hart and Mas-Colell (1996) . Hence, without modeling with a discount factor, the rejected players should organize themselves in a different bargaining rule from that for the incumbent players so that the entire bargaining can stop properly. And this does not seem far from reality. After all, two organizations rarely use identical rules.
Finally, for future research, the renegotiation idea of the paper may be useful for one to construct non-cooperative bargaining protocols for other self-dual solution concepts.
